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1. Introduction
Kratzer (1988) argues for the existence of a Davidsonian external spatio-temporal
argument / in DS of only those predicales which denote at 'stage-level', i.e.
temporary properties of individuals (Carlson 1977). Tliis additional argument is to
account for various syntacüc and sernanüc differences between such predicates and
predicales denoting persistent properties of individuals. Kratzer's (1988) most
important evidence for the additional argument is conccrned with a contrast in static
and dynamic predicates in when- clauses, illustrated in (1):
(1) a. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well
b. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well
(2) a. * Always [[know (Mary, French)] know well (Mary, French)]
b. Always; [[speak (Mary, French, /)] speak well (Mary, French, /)]
CP'
Γ INFL
INFL V P she speaks it well
Mary V
V NP
l l
speaks French
If vacuous quantification is not pennitted, the contrast in (la and b) is explained by
the fact. that the quantifier always binds the spatio-temporal argument variable / in
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(2b), whereas in (2a) there is no variable for it to bind. Diesing (1988) proposes
that the subject of stage-level predicates is generated within VP, whereas subjects
of iridividual-level predicates are generated in Spec of IP position. Kratzer's
Davidsonian argument is base-generated äs the external argument of stage-level
predicates, which forces their subjects to be generated VP-inlernally äs illustrated in
(2c). This syntactic difference carries over to LF, where external arguments are
mapped into the restrictive term, and internal arguments into the nuclear scope of
an unselectively binding quantifier. Existential closure of the arguments in the
nuclear scope (VP) ensures that subjects of stage-level predicates and indefinite
objects will be interpreted exislentially. Subjects of individual-Ievcl predicates
receive a generic Interpretation supplied by the universal quantifier or a generic
operator binding all arguments in its restrictive term. However, some indefinite
object NPs in the when-clause should not be incorporated into the restrictor: e.g.
(3a) is unacceptable, if the pronoun it is interpreted äs dependent on a donkey,
whereas (4a) is acceptable on that Interpretation. Kratzer (1988) therefore proposes
a more complex analysis where bolh the restrictive clause and the nuclear scope can
embed other restriclive clauses and nuclear scopes. Within the restrictive clauses of
(3a, 4a) represented in (3b, 4b), there will be a nuclear scope for the indefinite
object, rendering it inaccessible to the universal quantifier in both sentences, but the
indefinite subject in (4a) is still bound by the universal quantifier Always χ in (4b).
(3) a. * When Pedro has a donkey, he beats it
b. *Always [exist (Pedro;) and 5 χ [donkey (x) and have (hej, x)]]
Ξ / [beat (hei»ι x[donkey (x) and have (he;, x)], /)]
(4) a. When a farmer has a donkey, he beats it
b. Always x [ farmer (x) and 3 y [donkey (y) and have (x, y)]]
3 / [beat (he;, t yfdonkey (y) and have (x, y )], /)]
Kratzer (1988) admits that this still leaves problems for experienccr verbs (5a),
which exhibit the same structure äs (3a), but the indefinite object now appears to be
bound by the universal quantifier. Furthermore, de Hoop and de Swart (1989)
argue that this is also the case for epistemic sentences äs (5b). It is clear that all
mental verbs allow indefinite object NPs to scramble out of the subordinate nuclear
scope to receive a universal Interpretation in the restrictive term äs further illustrated
in (5c).
(5) a. When Sue likes a movie, she recommends it to everyone (dHdS 1989)
b. When Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it well (dHdS 1989)
c. When Jane fears a reviewer, she avoids him
As de Hoop and de Swart point out with (6a), indefinite count term subjects of
individual level predicates may well be existential, contrary to Kratzer's analysis
which forces all indefinites, bare plural or count term, to get universal force, based
on otherwise quite plausible generic readings of bare plural subjects of individual
level predicates äs in (6b).
(6) a. A fireman I know is altruistic (dH&dS 1989)
b. Firemen I know are altruistic
de Hoop & de Swart (1989) offcr an interesting comparison of Kratzer's analysis
with Chierchia (1988) which implements the Stage-Individual distinction
differently in a fully compositional dynamic Montague grammar. Stage-level
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predicates introduce a spatio-temporal "occasion" variable bound by an unselective
quantifier, individual-level predicates do not. As a consequence, sentences with
definite arguments (7a) constructed by stage-level predicates are dynamic
propositions, since their occasion-variable can be bound by the universal quantifier.
When indefinites occur in such sentences, they will also be bound by the universal
quantifier (7b, c).
(7) a. When Luciano is in the bathtub, he always sings
b. When an opera-singer is in the bathtub, he always sings
c. When Luciano sings an aria, he always sings it well
de Hoop & de Swart (1989) point out that Chierchia's analysis predicts that
existential quantifiers will always give rise to dynamic propositions, even with
individual-level predicates. Therefore, his analysis will correctly predict that the
indefinite objects in (5) are bound by the universal quantifier, but the very same
prediction is incorrectly made for (3a). In Chierchia (1990) the dynamic binding of
an indefinite NP can only become blocked, when it is interpreted in the scope of an
'externally closed' determiner like every or most, which is not the case in (3a).
Kratzer's (1988) concludes with a remark on the interaction of stage/individual level
predication with aspectual classes, suggesting that all individual-level predicates are
Stative (be altndstic, be intelligent), some statives are stage-level (be available, be
near something) and all events, atelic activities and telic accomplishments and
achievements, are stage-level too. This paper is intended to explore this suggested
connection with aspectual classes further. Our conclusions show that the relevant
distinction between static ('individual-level') and dynamic ('stage-level')
predication in terms of the presence or absence of a spatio-temporal argument does
not adequately address the binding problems in when- clauses. We will try to show
that both the static/dynamic distinction and the binding problems should rather be
accounted for by crucial quantificational differences in a compositional account of
the aspectual classes.
2. Complementation of aspectual verbs
The stage/individual contrast shows up clearly in the complementation of aspectual
verbs, where only stage-level predicates are acceptable (cf. (8 ac)). But a similar
reslriction appears on direct objects of aspectual verbs in (8d), which denote events
or in some temporal sense extended objects with inlernal change.
(8) a. *Jane started/continued/stopped being intelligent
b. Jane started/continued/stopped being ill
c. Jane started/continued/stopped smoking (a cigarette)
d. Jane started/continucd/stopped the concert/the conversation/her affair
Singular object NPs which denote static individuals are only acceptable when the
context supplies the action of which the NP-denotation is theme, äs in (9a).
However, bare plural or mass term NPs in the context of the dynamic, definite
aspectual verb stop can be interpreted generically äs 'individual-level' in (9b), but
they are completely unacceptable with static, universal aspectual verbs such äs
continue and keep (cf. ter Meulen 1990).
(9) a. Jane started/continued/stopped her book/ a drawing
b. Jane stopped poetry/books/concerts/affairs
c. *Jane continued/kept poetry/books/concerts/affairs
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Should this constitute an argument to provide all and only event-denoting NPs and
bare plurals in such contexts with a location argument?
If all generically interpretable object NPs must scramble into the restricüve term to
escape existential closure in the nuclear scope, äs Kratzer argues, then two
questions arise: (i) why only NPs denoting divisible objects seemingly do (8d, 9ab)
and (ii) why they can only scramble over dynamic aspectual verbs?
A closely related observation is that a gerundive activity-complement is similarly
generic in (lOa), whereas a gerundive accomplishment-complement is simply
existentially quantified in (lOb).
(10) a. Jane stopped reading poetry
b. Jane stopped reading a poem
From (lOa) we infer that after a certain time Jane never read any more poetry, of
which she had read some. But from (lOb) we merely infer that she discontinued
reading the poem she had started. Obviously, bare plurals and indefinite count
terms behave differently in crucial respects, even with stage-level predicates, and
not only äs subjects of individual level predicates äs we saw in (6ab). This gives us
reason to propose äs initial hypothesis that the issues at stake here are really
aspectual, rather than a matter of argument structure. Aspectual properties concern
the internal structure of events, and hence the question is what internal structure
events must have in order to permit dynamic'binding in w/ien-clauses.
3. The quantificational properties of aspect
Kratzer predicts that (l la) should be interpreted äs in (l Ib), and lacks a Symmetrie
reading: indefinite object NPs do not scramble out of nuclear scope with have.
(11) a. If a father has a teenage son, he usually lends him the car on the
weekends (Chierchia 1990)
b. usually χ [father' (x) & 3 y [teenage son' (y) & have1 (x, y)]]
t y [teenage son' (y) & have' (x, y) & lend the car' (x, y)]
Chierchia (1990) pointed out that (l 1) should have such a reading, quantifying over
father/son pairs. In a model in which every father has three sons, but lends his car
only to his eldest one, (11) should be false, but (llb), which is Kratzer's only
possible reading with an Ε-type pronoun and corresponding uniqueness effects, is
true. Since Kratzer puts the blame on the individual level have, (12 a-c) should
receive a similar analysis äs (llb), again lacking a natural Symmetrie reading.
(12) a. When a Student has a problem, he often blames it on his teachers
b. When Pedro has money, he spends it
c. When Pedro has cookies, he eats them
Of course, Kratzer can opt out of this by arguing thal having a problem is rather a
stage-level predicate. If so, (12a) can receive an ordinary binding analysis, using the
location-argument with a universal Interpretation over all cases of students with
Problems. This implies that there would be two homonymous verbs have, one
Stative and one dynamic with a different argument structure. Another even less
attractive soluüon would be to say that the interpreüve relation between have and its
complements (a donkey, vs. a problem, money, cookies), which presumably gets
determined either at LF or later in the semantics, creates a location-argument in DS.
This would make for an unwarranted dependency of DS on LF or on a semantic
component, running havoc wilh the fundamental division of labor between lexical
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properties at DS and the interpretive function of LF.
Kratzer predicts that individual level predicates with indefinite subjects and objects
lack a reading where the object is scrambled and hence universally interpreted,
while the subject remains existential, since her framework crucially does not allow
discourse existential closure äs in DRT and file change semantics. Yet we find
quite natural examples of such asymmetric scrambled interpretations, äs in (13).
(13) a. When a reviewer likes a paper, it is seldom rejected
b. seldom y [ paper'(y) & 3 x [reviewer' (x) & like' (x, y)]]
3 / [rejected'(y), / ]
The truth-conditions of the Ε-type reading of (13) which Kratzer would be able to
get, would be much stronger than seems required, quantifying over reviewer/paper
pairs.
If anything is a permanent state, äs Kratzer's intuitive characterization of individual
level predicates requires, then perfective states must be permanent. For once one
stops having a donkey, one will for ever have had a donkey. Now it becomes ever
niore transparent that temporal duration of the state is not the crucial concept, but
rather internal quantificational structurc within events. As soon äs you partition an
event into repeatable structure, äs in (14b) is effected by/or a while, the requisite
binding becomes acceptable.
(14) a. *When Pedro has had a donkey, he sells it
b. When Pedro has had a donkey for a while, he sells it
This leads us to conclude that the unselective binding may get restricted by the
internal structure of the event containing free arguments. This is partly determined
by the aspectual properties of the verb and adverbial modification, and should be
compositionally structured with the aspectual properties of its arguments.
Unselective binding may be rather more selective. Not all indefinite arguments
have to be bound simultaneously, but at least one variable has to get bound by the
quantifier in Order to avoid vacuous quantification.
4. Durative adverbials and quantificational VPs
A quantificational representation of lexical aspectual factors is crucial for a coherent
explanation of these facts. The interaction between perfective tense and adverbials
was illustrated above; now we turn to the relation between aspectual properties and
adverbials. The quantificational properties of durative adverbials distinguish
individual-level predicates of the love, know type in (15) and activiües in (16) from
both accomplishments and achievements in (17-18). Verbs such äs like, know,fear
don't describe real states, since they require energy to be upheld in the sense of
Comrie (1976). Let us call the set of verbs including both these mental verbs and
activiües 'Perpetuations' to distinguish thera from the aspectual class of genuine
Stative verbs such äs have, please, involve, in order to dissociate this aspectual class
completely from the notion of agentivity.1 Besides the existential reading, in the
* Tliis class is confonn to Comrie's (1976) defmition of dynamic situations: Comrie (1976:49)
states that a dynamic Situation will continue if subject to a new input of energy. In the literature
on lexical aspect, the tests to distinguish the class of activiües include mainly criteria for
agentivity, not for temporal-aspectual properties (e.g. Vendler 1967, Dowty 1979). Agentivity or
the lack of locomotion does not, acording to us, characterize a proper aspectual class. Tlie approach
presenied here is more in line with recent analyses of the relation between agentivity and aspect
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sentences (15-16) the indefinite objects can receive a universal Interpretation, which
is clearly linked to a generic Interpretation of the sentence.
(15) a. Before the war, Mary loved a movie for months
(i) When Mary loved a movie, she kept loving it for months
(ii) For every movie Mary loved before the war, she loved it for months
b. Before the accident, Sue knew a phonenumber for years
(i) When Sue knew a phonenumber, she kept knowing it for years
(ii) For every phonenumber Sue knew before the accident, she knew it
for years
(16) a. After an intense learning period, Mary spoke a language for years
(i) When Mary spoke a language, she kept speaking it for years
(ii) For every language Mary spoke after learning it, she spoke it for years
b. In his youth, Edouard hunted a pheasant for hours
(i) When Edouard hunted a pheasant, he kept hunting it for hours
(ii) For every pheasant Edouard hunted in his youth, he hunted it for hours
This generic reading is obtained by a generic operator in C°. A universal
Interpretation of the indefinite object NP does not exist for accomplishments and
achievements. The asterisks on the accompanying when- clauses illustrate that
these sentences do not constitute adequate paraphrases for (17a-18a), on the reading
where it is bound by the indefinite direct object:
(17) a. On her way to work, Sue found a nickel for months
(i) * When Sue found a nickel, she kept finding it for months
(ii) * For every nickel Sue found on her way to work, she found it for
months
b. For months Sue kept finding a nickel
c. Sue found a nickel on her way to work and she continued to find one/*it
for months
(18) a. After John called, Sue broke a wine-glass for days
(i) *When Sue broke a wine-glass, she kept breaking it for days
(ii) * For every wine-glass Sue broke, she kept breaking it for days
b. For days, Sue broke different wine-glasses
c. Sue broke a wine-glass after John called, and she continued to break
one/*it for days 2
The durative adverbial in (17-18) seems to universally quantify over nickel-
findings and wine-glass breakings rather than over nickels and wine-glasses. This
which assume Üiat botl) types of semanüc informalion belong lo different 'liers' (Jackendoff 1987,
Pustejovsky 1988).
^ The anaphor one is acceptable, which indicates Uiat many instanccs of Üie saine type of wine-
glass were broken. Such type-shifted Interpretation is not available with tlie simple pronoun it, cf.
ter Meulcn (1988). Verbs of creaüon seem to allow such type-shifted anaphoric dependencies more
easily, e.g.
(I) a. After Üie war, GM built a four-cylinder engine for years
(i) When GM built a four-cylinder engine, Uiey kept building it for years
(ii) * For every four-cylinder engine GM built after Üie war, they built it for years
b. For years, GM built different lokens of a type of four-cylinder engine
c. GM built a four-cylinder engine after the war, and tliey continued to build *one/?it for years
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suggests that durative adverbials quantify over the VP of accomplishments/
achievements without binding their direct objects, since the indefinite object is a
new one in each Situation. Durative adverbials do not quantify over the VPs of
Perpetuations in (15-16). They only measure out the timespan during which the
Situation was the case, i.e. event-internal duration. The durative VP adverbial does
not give rise to the knowing of different phonenumbers (15), the speaking of
different languages or the hunting of different pheasants (16) within the given
period. Rather, the generic operator in C° which binds the direct object gives rise to
an Interpretation where the Situation is true for every phonenumber, language, or
pheasant within the given timeperiod. If anything, the durative adverbial
unselectively binds at least one frce argument-variable in the event, instead of just
the VP.
Besides the correct Suggestion by de Hoop & de Swart (1989) that universal
binding is obtained for any sentence with at least one indefinite NP, there appear to
be other ways to make situations quantifiable. Compare (19) where the definite
direct object has a kind reading to (17-18):
(19) a. When Sue cleans her/ this car, she cleans it well.
b. When this developer builds this house, she sells it well.
Notice however that a kind reading is not necessary to obtain 'multiple' readings:
(20) a. When Mary spots this old Citroen DS, she always follows it.
b. When Sue finds this book on her desk, she removes it.
Individual-level know, love, like verbs lack this reading, although it is fine with
activities, äs may be clear from the contrast in (lab) and (21):
(21) a. * When Mary likes this old Citroen DS, she tries to buy it.
b. * When Sue knows this book, she tries to buy it.
The contrast between (20) and (21) shows that the relevant property involved is the
repeatability of the VP, rather than the indefmiteness of NPs or location arguments.
This result partly confirms our obscrvations for durative adverbials, suggesting that
the VPs of accomplishment/ achievemenl vcrbs are in some sense closed, making
the indefinite object NP inaccessiblc. Perpetuations do not seera to require their
VPs to be closed in this sense, allowing their indefinite object NPs to be
unselectively bound.
5. Unselective binding of [Spec, VP]
Let us now see how these observations can be accounted for in an LF where
unselective binding needs at least one free variable. If lexical verbs have
quantificational force, äs we argue, they encode this quantificational force in their
[Spec, VP] by Spec-Head agreement. Our [Spec, VP] position contains a
quantificational marker QF which encodes the quantificational aspectual force of its
verb.3
A verb with existential force has a QF in [Spec, VP] introducing a variable free for
binding by unselective operators.The aspectual classes of accomplishment and
achievement verbs encode existential force in their QF in [Spec, VP], e.g. (20b)
effecting quantification over findings of this book. If the direct object is indefinite
3 The idea lo assign an aspectual-quanüficational t'orce lo [Spec, VP] has its precursor in Emunds
(1986), which proposed ihat Üie closed class of specifiers detennining Ihe lexical category V
includes thcsetof aspectual adverbs/wii, again, soon, already, still, always.
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as in (17a (i)) and (18a (i)), it cannot serve äs antecedent for dynamic binding. This
indicates clearly that the QF of accomplishments and achievements blocks all free
argument variables for unselective binding, and hence they will be interpreted
existentially.
Since Perpetuations have universal quantificational force, they cannot contribute
any variable to QF. The variables of indefinite NPs will hence remain accessible for
unselective binding by universal operators. Consequently the indefinite objects in
(15a (i)) and (16a (i)) can bind dynamically the anaphor it. But the question
reraains what explains the puzzle we stärted out with in (1), setting within the
Perpetuations the mental verbs apart from the activities. Since there are no free
argument-variables in (Ib), quantification should be vacuous. So what is the
aspectual difference between knowing French and speaking it?
Verbs such as love, know, like, fear denote the kind of Situation which lacks the
internal structure required for repetition or for doing it bit by bit, incrementally.
This is precisely what they have in common with the universal aspectual verb keep,
which allows no gaps in the period over which it holds. One can only keep doing
something, when one is doing it right at that very moment. The other
Perpetuations, which include the traditional Activities, are crucially different. They
behave like continue, in the sense that they have universal force, but allow for gaps
to intervene between their stages. After coming out of a coma during which you
did not speak French, you can continue to s'peak French, if you spoke it before. But
you can only keep speaking French, if you spoke it while in coma. Within a fixed
perspective one can continue to do something again, but one cannot keep doing
something again. Hence continue allows gaps, which provide the required internal
structure for incrementing that keep lacks. In this sense, continue is distributive,
like the Boolean universal determiner every. Keep is not distributive, but
continuous, like the non-Boolean plural universal all. Predicates of the know, love,
fear type are not distributive universale, but activities are.
There may well be various alternative ways of representing this quantificational
force in LF or with semantic tools, and we will only indicate here one possible way
of formalizing the differences using our QF node. This aspectual difference can be
encoded in our QF by giving it static, universal force for the know, love, fear type
verbs. For activities, QF should get universal force with a subordinated variable
which receives existential force.4 In (Ib) this subordinated free variable can be
bound by when, without blocking its indefinite direct object for unselective binding.
But (la) will be out due to vacuous quantification, since no such subordinated free
variable is present in [Spec, VP] to encode the existential force.
In order to explain the contrast between (15-16) with no VP quantification and (Π-
Ι 8) with VP quantification, these adverbials are not specifiers of the VP, but
quantificational operators which only locally bind [Spec, VP] positions. This
accounts for the multiply interpreted achievement VPs (find a nickel, break a wine-
(22) [cp C [IP I [vp'tvp QF\ [v find a nickel]v]vp for monthsj]vp']lp]cP
Al LF, QF will be bound by the universal durative quantifier. Being existentially
closed within a multiply interpreted VP, the indefinite direct object in these
sentences refers to different nickels and different glasses with each finding or
4 Weatlier-type verbs like rain, snow, hail belong also to Uns aspcctual class of activities will)
internal dynamics but universally quantified indefinite argumenls.
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breaking.
This analysis also accounts for the fact (hat indefinite direct objects of Perpetuations
are not bound by the durative adverbials. In (15-16), a universal reading of the
indefinite object is only brought about by a unselective operator in C°. The
existential reading of the indefinite object is possible on a non generic reading of the
sentence. Universal operators in CP are not 'local [Spec, VP]' binders, but they can
bind both indefinite NPs and VPs. This difference between 'nonlocal' CP operators
and 'local' VP operators corresponds to the difference between temporal
(when(ever)) and aspectual (always, often, for NP) adverbs.
So far we have discussed Perpetuations, accomplishments and achievements, and
the way in which the QF in their [Spec, VP] encodes their quantificational force.
We still have to discuss the remaining 'real' Stative verbs such äs have, deserve,
please, involve. These verbs are like accomplishments/achievements in that they
encode existential force in QF which can be universally bound at LF.
(23) a. When a Student/ Dan had a problem, he usually blamed it on his teacher
b. When a Student/ Lucy deserved an A+, she usually got it
c. When a crime/ Watergate involved a Senator, it usually ended his career
d. When a movie/ Casablanca pleased a spectator, it usually made him cry
In (23), the variables in [Spec, VP] and the indefinite subjecls will be bound by the
universal operator when. This allows us to explain the fact that all so-called
individual-level predicates certainly can function äs stage-level predicates, without
using heavy DS projected machinery.
Let's return to the 'donkey sentences' in (3a) versus (lla) and (12). How do we
resolve the differences in direct objects of have without resorting to lexical
ambiguity?
6. One-time only readings
De Hoop & de Swart (1989) observe that the indefinites in (24) are necessary to
make the Situation quantifiable.
(24) a. When Mary built *the/a cottage in this village, she built it well
b. When *Akil / an Indian died, his widow usually was burned with him
Quantification over situations correlates with quantification over the arguments of
the sentence. They conclude that the stage - individual distinction is secondary: the
important generalizalion is that quantification is only possible if one of the
arguments is variable.
In our view, the compositional Interpretation of the verb and its complement yield a
one-time only reading for the VP. The unselective operator in C° binds the variable
in [Spec, VP] at LF. At the pragmatic level of Interpretation where world-
knowledge comes into play, the multiple reading imposed on the VP by the
universal quantifier binding the [Spec,, VP] is further constrained by the one-time
only Interpretation. Accomplishments such äs darken, melt, cool can usually be
repeated. Certain achievements readily allow for repeatable events (disappear,
awaken), but certain other verbs describe non-repeatable or one time only events
(die, come ofage). These properties are not aspectual properties of these verbs,
since this type of repeatability is not a factor of the internal structure of the event,
but a pragmatic one.
Since die and build the cottage in (24) are such one-time VPs, binding of the
variable in [Spec, VP] is constrained to one unique value when the subject is a
proper name. However, when the subject is indefinite or a functional definite
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description, the subject contains a vraible free for unselective bidning, and the VP is
unique for each case. Hence there is no problem of vacuous quantification, or
Interpretation. Notice that in certain contexts one time VPs can have a multiple
Interpretation predicated of a single individual:
(25) a. When Luciano died on stage, he usually did it very convincingly
b. When *my car / the volcano exploded, it usually caused a lot of damage
c. When the Arctic icecap melted, it usually raised the sealevel
We are finally ready to explain the donkey sentences in (3-4). Have a donkey is
nonrepeatable in the same way äs one-time only accomplishments and
achievements. The contrast between (3) and (4) is explained in the same way äs the
contrast in (24). The one-time only VP cannot be predicated repeatedly of a single
individual, but it is fine when both subject and the [Spec, VP] are bound.
However, there are contexts in which the Interpretation of the VP does not allow
this property to be predicated of a multiply interpreted subject äs in (26).
(26) a. * When a farmer has Smokey, he beats him (dH & dS '89:(28))
b. * When a father has John for a son, he spanks him
This problem is not limited to individual-level predicates. Assuming that there are
no remakes of Wings of desire, or identical copies of my parents' house, the
following sentences are equally unacceptable:
(27) a. * When an American made Wings of desire, he usually recommended it
b. * When a German architect built my parents' first house, he usually built
it well.
If quantification only depended on the variability of the arguments, one would
wonder why the operator cannot bind the subject in (27). Making a specific movie
or a specific house is a one-time event that can only be predicated of a single
person, or perhaps a single group of persons. The same can be said in our culture
about possessing specific things or animals such äs Smokey, or having a specific
son, which involve one-duration situations. It should be noted that when the
background already provides the appropriate quantificational slructure in which
having a donkey is interpreted äs recurring, (3a) becomes quite acceptable, e.g.
(28) In our Community we share all donkeys. Each farmer gets bis turn to use
one. When Pedro has a donkey, he beats it. We don't like that at all.
In our analysis, the difference between 'individual-level' have a donkey and 'stagc-
level' have a problein/cookies/ nwney in (12) is due to interpretive factors rather
than to DS projected location arguments. As in (28) context may force an
individual level predicate into a multiply quantificational structure, but the reverse is
not possible. Hence we predict that be available cannot be used äs individual level
predicate.
7. Summary and conclusion
The phenomena involved in the Interpretation of when clauses and clauses with
durative adverbials involve two distinct components of the grammar. The first is
the lexical aspect of verbs, where Perpetuations contrast with accomplishments,
achievements and states respectively. The second factor is an interpretive conslraint
which might be claimed to be pragmatic in nature, involving the one- time only
Interpretation of VPs. Both factors have to be related to one another in order to
achieve a coherent explanation of unselective binding propertics. If aspecl is simply
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viewed äs temporal reference, there is no way in which this can be achieved, since
it is unclear what purely temporal and purely quantificational properties should
have in common. However, if lexical aspect is viewed in terms of internal
quantificational structure of events, its relation with quantificational when clauses
and with the uniqueness interpretations of VP and events is clarified. Our analysis
is flexible enough to allow a variety of meanings to be created, and restrictive
enough to rule out the relevant sentences.
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